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320 F.3d 200
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO
CORPORATION, BWTdirect, LLC and Santa Fe
Natural Tobacco Co., Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
George E. PATAKI, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of New York, Eliot Spitzer,
in his official capacity as Attorney General of
the State of New York, Antonia C. Novello,
M.D., in her official capacity as Commissioner
of Health of the State of New York and Arthur
J. Roth, individually and in his capacity as
Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of the
State of New York, Defendants-Appellants,
Teresa Mason, individually and in her capacity
as Sheriff of the City of New York, Defendant.
Docket Nos. 01-7806, 01-7813.  | Argued:
June 14, 2002.  | Decided: Feb. 13, 2003.
Governor and other State officials appealed from a judgment
entered in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Loretta A. Preska, J., 2001 WL 636441,
which struck down as unconstitutional section of New
York's Public Health Law prohibiting cigarette sellers and
common and contract carriers from shipping and transporting
cigarettes directly to New York consumers. The Court of
Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that statute did not violate
dormant Commerce Clause.
Reversed with directions.
José A. Cabranes, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in
the judgment on separate grounds.
West Headnotes (13)
[1] Commerce
Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83 Commerce
83I Power to Regulate in General
83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83k12 In General
Commerce Clause contains a negative or
“dormant” aspect that denies the States the power
unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden
the interstate flow of articles of commerce.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[2] Commerce
Regulation and Conduct in General; 
 Particular Businesses
83 Commerce
83II Application to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(B) Conduct of Business in General
83k56 Regulation and Conduct in General; 
 Particular Businesses
Fundamental objective of the dormant
Commerce Clause is to preserve a national
market for competition undisturbed by
preferential advantages conferred by a State
upon its residents or resident competitors.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[3] Commerce
Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83 Commerce
83I Power to Regulate in General
83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83k12 In General
In reviewing whether a statute violates the
dormant Commerce Clause, threshold question
is whether a state or local government is
“regulating;” if a statute “regulates,” then the
second question is whether the statute, in
“regulating,” affects interstate commerce, and, if
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so, court must determine whether the regulation
discriminates against interstate commerce or
regulates evenhandedly with incidental effects
on interstate commerce. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 3.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[4] Commerce
Local Matters Affecting Commerce
83 Commerce
83I Power to Regulate in General
83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83k13.5 Local Matters Affecting Commerce
A state “regulates,” for Commerce Clause,
purposes only it exercises governmental powers
that are unavailable to “private parties,” and
the regulation affects interstate commerce,
only when it discriminates against interstate
commerce, or imposes burdens on interstate
commerce that are incommensurate with
putative local gains. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8,
cl. 3.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[5] Commerce
Regulation and Conduct in General; 
 Particular Businesses
83 Commerce
83II Application to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(B) Conduct of Business in General
83k56 Regulation and Conduct in General; 
 Particular Businesses
Legislation that causes certain out-of-state
companies to cease selling in a particular state
will not violate the dormant Commerce Clause as
long as other out-of-state suppliers will promptly
replace the goods that would have been sold
by the companies that cease selling in state.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
Cases that cite this headnote
[6] Commerce
Regulation and Conduct in General; 
 Particular Businesses
83 Commerce
83II Application to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(B) Conduct of Business in General
83k56 Regulation and Conduct in General; 
 Particular Businesses
Discrimination against commerce itself occurs
when a statute (1) shifts the costs of regulation
onto other states, permitting in-state lawmakers
to avoid the costs of their political decisions,
(2) has the practical effect of requiring out-of-
state commerce to be conducted at the regulating
state's direction, or (3) alters the interstate flow of
the goods in question, as distinct from the impact
on companies trading in those goods. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
4 Cases that cite this headnote
[7] Commerce
Local Matters Affecting Commerce
83 Commerce
83I Power to Regulate in General
83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83k13.5 Local Matters Affecting Commerce
Statutes that evince discrimination against
interstate commerce are scrutinized strictly, i.e.,
the burden falls on the State to justify the
discrimination both in terms of the local benefits
flowing from the statute and the unavailability
of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to
preserve the local interests at stake. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
4 Cases that cite this headnote
[8] Commerce
Local Matters Affecting Commerce
83 Commerce
83I Power to Regulate in General
83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
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83k13.5 Local Matters Affecting Commerce
A statute that does not on its face discriminate
may run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause
if, in advancing a legitimate local purpose, it
imposes burdens on interstate commerce greater
than the local benefits secured. U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[9] Commerce
Local Matters Affecting Commerce
83 Commerce
83I Power to Regulate in General
83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83k13.5 Local Matters Affecting Commerce
Statutes that do not facially discriminate but
run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause
by imposing burdens on interstate commerce
greater than the local benefits secured, although
not strictly scrutinized, are evaluated under
the balancing test articulated in Pike, which
evaluates whether the statute's burdens on
interstate commerce are clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
[10] Commerce
Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83 Commerce
83I Power to Regulate in General
83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
83k12 In General
Court reviews de novo whether a statute as a
matter of law discriminates on its face or in
its effect against interstate commerce; whether
a statute discriminates impermissibly against
interstate commerce is a mixed question of law
and fact that is also reviewed de novo. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[11] Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Validity
Commerce
Manufacture and Sale of Goods
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIII Statutory Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection
29TIII(A) In General
29Tk126 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
29Tk129 Validity
(Formerly 92Hk2.1 Consumer Protection)
83 Commerce
83II Application to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(B) Conduct of Business in General
83k60 Manufacture and Sale of Goods
83k60(1) In General
New York Public Health Law section
prohibiting cigarette sellers and common
and contract carriers from shipping and
transporting cigarettes directly to New York
consumers did not facially discriminate against
interstate commerce in violation of dormant
Commerce Clause; neither statute's closure
of a sales channel for retail cigarette sales
nor statute's delivery exemption discriminated
against interstate commerce. U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; N.Y.McKinney's Public Health
Law § 1399-ll.
7 Cases that cite this headnote
[12] Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Validity
Commerce
Manufacture and Sale of Goods
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIII Statutory Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection
29TIII(A) In General
29Tk126 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
29Tk129 Validity
(Formerly 92Hk2.1 Consumer Protection)
83 Commerce
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83II Application to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(B) Conduct of Business in General
83k60 Manufacture and Sale of Goods
83k60(1) In General
New York Public Health Law section
prohibiting cigarette sellers and common and
contract carriers from shipping and transporting
cigarettes directly to New York consumers did
not discriminate against interstate commerce
in its effect; neither statute's closure of
a sales channel for retail cigarette sales
nor statute's delivery exemption discriminated
against interstate commerce, but instead had
only incidental effects on interstate commerce.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3;
N.Y.McKinney's Public Health Law § 1399-ll.
8 Cases that cite this headnote
[13] Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Validity
Commerce
Manufacture and Sale of Goods
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIII Statutory Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection
29TIII(A) In General
29Tk126 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
29Tk129 Validity
(Formerly 92Hk2.1 Consumer Protection)
83 Commerce
83II Application to Particular Subjects and
Methods of Regulation
83II(B) Conduct of Business in General
83k60 Manufacture and Sale of Goods
83k60(1) In General
New York Public Health Law section
prohibiting cigarette sellers and common and
contract carriers from shipping and transporting
cigarettes directly to New York consumers did
not violate dormant Commerce Clause under
Pike balancing test; statute's incidental burdens
on interstate commerce were not excessive
relative to its local benefits in reducing minors'
access to cigarettes through direct sales channels
and reducing cigarette consumption by requiring
consumers to pay New York's high excise
taxes. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3;
N.Y.McKinney's Public Health Law § 1399-ll.
10 Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*202  Lisa M. Landau, Assistant Attorney General of the
State of New York, New York, N.Y. (Eliot Spitzer, Attorney
General of the State of New York, Caitlin J. Halligan,
Solicitor General of the State of New York, Daniel Smirlock,
Deputy Solicitor General, Andrew Bing, Assistant Solicitor
General, on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellants.
David H. Remes, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC
(M. Stacey Bach, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC,
Laurence A. Silverman, Mark P. Gimbel, Covington &
Burling, New York, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-
Appellees Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. and
BWTDirect, LLC.
Rodrick J. Enns, Enns & Archer LLP, Winston-Salem, NC
(Franklin B. Velie, Dierdre A. Burgman, Salans Hertzfeld
Heilbronn Christy & Viener, New York, NY), *203  for
Plaintiff-Appellee Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co., Inc.
Before: MINER, CABRANES, and POOLER, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion
Judge CABRANES concurs in the judgment.
MINER, Circuit Judge.
Defendants-appellants the Governor of the State of New
York and other State officials (the “State”) appeal from a
judgment entered in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Preska, J.) striking down as
unconstitutional section 1399-ll of New York's Public Health
Law (“the Statute”), the court having found that the Statute
discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause. The Statute prohibits cigarette sellers and
common and contract carriers from shipping and transporting
cigarettes directly to New York consumers.
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Plaintiffs-appellees, Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co., Inc.
(“Santa Fe”), Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
and BWTDirect, LLC (together “B & W”) filed complaints,
later consolidated in the district court, challenging the
constitutionality of the Statute under the Commerce Clause
and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. On November 13,
2000, the district court issued a temporary restraining
order prohibiting enforcement of the Statute. On April
24, 2001, the district court consolidated the hearing on a
motion for preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits.
Following a five-day bench trial, the district court, in an
unpublished corrected opinion, declared the Statute to be
an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause and
permanently enjoined its enforcement. Santa Fe Natural
Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Spitzer, Nos. 00-7274, 00-7750, 2001
WL 636441 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2001).
The court found that the Statute was subject to strict scrutiny
because it discriminated against interstate commerce both on
its face “by requiring that retail sales take place only in-state,”
id. at *13, and in effect by “effectively bann[ing interstate
direct shippers] from engaging in retail cigarette sales with
New York customers,” id. at *17. In applying strict scrutiny,
the court concluded that the State failed to demonstrate
the absence of less discriminatory means of advancing a
legitimate state interest. Id. at *21-28. In the alternative, the
court found that the Statute also failed the less stringent Pike
balancing test because the marginal ability of the Statute to
further its “wholly laudable goals” was outweighed by its
substantial interference with interstate commerce. Id. at *29.
The State timely appealed.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
The background of this case is set forth in precise detail in
the district court's opinion, familiarity with which is assumed.
Only the facts necessary to our disposition are recounted here.
I. The Statute
On August 16, 2000, section 1399-ll of New York's Public
Health Law, entitled “Unlawful shipment or transport of
cigarettes,” was signed into law. The Statute reads in relevant
part:
1. It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in the
business of selling cigarettes to ship or cause to be shipped
any cigarettes to any person in this state who is not: (a)
a person licensed as a cigarette tax agent or wholesale
dealer ...; (b) an export warehouse proprietor ... or an
operator of a customs bonded warehouse ...; or (c) a person
who is an officer, employee or agent of the *204  United
States government, this state or a department, agency,
instrumentality or political subdivision of the United States
or this state, when such person is acting in accordance with
his or her official duties....
2. It shall be unlawful for any common or contract carrier
to knowingly transport cigarettes to any person in this state
reasonably believed by such carrier to be other than a
person described in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subdivision
one of this section. For purposes of the preceding sentence,
if cigarettes are transported to a home or residence, it shall
be presumed that the common or contract carrier knew
that such person was not a person described in paragraph
(a), (b) or (c) of subdivision one of this section. It shall
be unlawful for any other person to knowingly transport
cigarettes to any person in this state, other than to a person
described in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subdivision one of
this section. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed
to prohibit a person other than a common or contract carrier
from transporting not more than eight hundred cigarettes at
any one time to any person in this state.
N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 1399-ll (1)-(2). Simply put,
subdivision one subjects to civil and criminal penalties
cigarette sellers who ship cigarettes directly to New York
consumers, and subdivision two subjects to the same penalties
those who transport cigarettes to New York consumers.
Subdivision two specifically applies to “any common or
contract carrier,” or “any other person” not a common
or contract carrier, that “knowingly” transports cigarettes
to anyone other than a permitted recipient, as defined in
subdivision one of the Statute. Id. § 1399-ll (2). 1  Subdivision
two includes a limited exception from the penalties for direct
delivery of cigarettes, which permits the delivery by “a person
other than a common or contract carrier” of four cartons or
fewer of cigarettes to “any person in this state.” Id.
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1 The penalty provision of section 1399-ll reads in full:
Any person who violates the provisions of
subdivision one or two of this section shall be
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and for a second
or subsequent violation shall be guilty of a class
E felony. In addition to the criminal penalty, the
commissioner may impose a civil fine not to exceed
five thousand dollars for each such violation on
any person who violates subdivision one or two
of this section. The commissioner may impose a
civil fine not to exceed five thousand dollars for
each violation of subdivision three of this section
on any person engaged in the business of selling
cigarettes who ships or causes to be shipped any
such cigarettes to any person in this state.
N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 1399-ll (5).
The legislative findings made in support of the Statute
“declare[ ] that the shipment of cigarettes sold via the internet
or by telephone or by mail order to residents of this state poses
a serious threat to public health, safety, and welfare, to the
funding of health care ..., and to the economy of the state.”
Id. ch. 262, § 1. The legislature also found that cigarette sales
accomplished through direct shipment made the verification
of the purchaser's age difficult and that existing penalties for
cigarette bootlegging were inadequate. Id.
II. The District Court's Opinion
A. The District Court's Finding That the Statute
Discriminates Facially and in Effect
The district court applied strict scrutiny analysis based on its
determination that the Statute discriminated against interstate
commerce both on its face and in effect. Id. at *13, *17. The
court found that the Statute was facially discriminatory *205
for two reasons. First, the court concluded that although the
Statute's prohibitions apply to both in-state and out-of-state
direct cigarette sellers,
the law, on its face, discriminates
against interstate commerce by
requiring that retail sales take place
only in-state. Specifically, subdivision
1 prohibits the direct shipment of
cigarettes to any person in New
York who is not a licensed tax
agent or wholesaler, export warehouse
proprietor, operator of a customs
bonded warehouse, or government
official. Therefore, the only way to
effect a retail sale to a New York
consumer is by an in-state, face-to-
face transaction. Thus, subdivision 1
shifts the interstate retail market to
instate brick-and-mortar retailers.
Id. at *13. Second, the court found facially discriminatory the
so-called delivery exception embodied in the last sentence of
subdivision two. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll (2). The
court rejected the State's argument that the exception “only
permits consumers[, rather than brick-and-mortar retailers
with home-delivery services,] to transport up to four cartons
of cigarettes to their homes or to other individuals.” Santa Fe,
2001 WL 636441, at *14.
The court found instead that “[a]s the statute is drafted, out-
of-state retailers that depend on common or contract carriers
are prohibited from directly selling and delivering cigarettes
to consumers, while in-state brick-and-mortar outlets that
have their own delivery services are not.” Id. The court
concluded that because of this “local benefit,” the Statute
“discriminates on its face against interstate commerce by
providing a delivery exemption for New York brick-and-
mortar businesses with their own delivery services.” Id.
For similar reasons, the court found that the Statute
discriminates against interstate commerce in effect. Id. at
*16-17. First, the court stated that “[t]he only way an out-
of-state seller could legally sell retail cigarettes to New
York consumers under [the Statute] is to establish a brick-
and-mortar outlet in New York.” Id. at *16. The court
credited testimony that this option was “unworkable” and
“uneconomic” for the Plaintiffs and that, as a result, “the
effect of [the Statute] is to eliminate out-of-state direct sales
retailers from the market by requiring face-to-face, in-state
retail sales only.” Id. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72,
83 S.Ct. 1201, 10 L.Ed.2d 202 (1963), the district court found
the Statute's effect discriminatory because “[a] state may not
require an out-of-state operator ‘to become a resident in order
to compete on equal terms.’ ” Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441,
at *16.
Second, the court concluded that the delivery exception also
discriminated against interstate commerce in effect based on
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the finding that “it is not economically feasible for interstate
businesses to make deliveries to New York customers using
their own trucks.” Id. According to the court, the delivery
exception therefore demonstrates another way in which
“interstate direct sellers are effectively banned from engaging
in retail cigarette sales with New York consumers.” Id. at *17.
B. The District Court's Rejection of the Justifications
Offered in Support of the Statute
Having found that the Statute discriminates against interstate
commerce, the court then sought to determine whether the
State had satisfied its burden of “ ‘justify[ing] it both in
terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and
the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate
to preserve the local interests *206  at stake.’ ” Id. at
*11 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336, 99
S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979)). The State asserted two
local benefits in its effort to survive strict scrutiny: (1) the
prevention of cigarette sales to minors, and (2) the prevention
of untaxed cigarette sales. Id. at *18.
1. Direct Sales of Cigarettes to Minors
The State argued to the district court that the Statute would
reduce cigarette sales to minors because it requires face-to-
face transactions in which sellers can verify the purchaser's
age. The court rejected this assertion, finding that the State
did not demonstrate “(1) that minors use direct sales channels
to a significant degree to acquire cigarettes and, thus, that
any material benefit will accrue from the statute; or (2)
that the State has no less discriminatory means available to
reduce smoking among minors.” Id. at *18. In concluding that
the Statute would not meaningfully address the problem of
underage smoking, the court emphasized “loopholes” in the
Statute that it found “fatal to its effectiveness.” Id. at *20.
The court identified these loopholes as: (1) the four-carton
delivery exception; (2) sales made by Indian nations; and (3)
shipments made by the United States Postal Service.
As noted above, the district court interpreted the delivery
exemption to permit local businesses to deliver cigarettes to
New York consumers while prohibiting out-of-state sellers
from doing the same. The district court construed this to be a
loophole because, under its interpretation of the exemption's
language and effect, minors still would be able to purchase
cigarettes for home delivery-and avoid the age verification
of a face-to-face transaction-by ordering cigarettes from
local brick-and-mortar vendors utilizing their own delivery
services.
As to sales by Indian nations, the court stated that they
represent a “de facto exemption” because “Indians living
on-reservation are not subject to New York excise or sales
taxes, and New York does not require retailers on Indian
reservations to collect and remit to the State excise and sales
taxes owed by such retailers' non-Indian customers.” Id. at
*7. As a result, the court was “persuaded that no enforcement
efforts under [the Statute] will be directed to direct sellers on
Indian reservations.” Id. at *8.
With respect to cigarette shipments by the United States
Postal Service, the court observed that “the Postal Service,
not the states, has exclusive authority to designate what can
and cannot be sent through the mails.” Id. at *9. The court
was therefore similarly “persuaded that the Postal Service will
not and cannot assist in enforcement of [the Statute].” Id. n.
17. The district court concluded that, absent the ability to
restrict deliveries by the Postal Service, the Statute would be
ineffective in preventing deliveries of cigarettes to minors. Id.
These loopholes, coupled with the court's finding that the
State failed to show that minors purchased cigarettes to
any significant degree by direct shipment, led the court
to conclude that the Statute was not sufficiently tailored
to achieve the goal of reducing direct cigarette sales to
minors. Id. at *20. The court also concluded that the
State had not demonstrated that less discriminatory means
were unavailable because “there [was] no evidence in
the record that New York has developed or tried any
alternative less discriminatory means of preventing minors
from obtaining cigarettes through direct sales channels rather
than completely banning these sales.” Id. at *21.
*207  2. Sale of Untaxed Cigarettes
The State also argued to the district court that one of the
Statute's purposes is to require purchasers, by virtue of the
face-to-face transaction, to pay the state excise tax. The
State claims that the high excise tax decreases demand for
cigarettes and thereby protects the health of New York
consumers. The district court credited the State's argument,
finding that the evidence “demonstrated that an increase in
the price of cigarettes will lead to a decrease in the demand
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for cigarettes.” Id. at *25. The court concluded, however,
that the State failed to show that the Statute would advance
this “worthy goal” or that no less discriminatory means were
available. Id. at *25. Citing the loopholes discussed above,
the court concluded that the State did not satisfy its “burden
of demonstrating that [the Statute] will effect the benefit of
reducing smoking through the maintenance of high cigarette
prices” because “Indian retailers can and will continue to
sell cigarettes by direct sales to New York consumers,” and
because the Statute “cannot be enforced against the U.S.
Postal Service.” Id. at *26.
The court also found that the Statute failed strict scrutiny
because the State did not demonstrate a lack of less
discriminatory means for collecting the cigarette excise tax.
Id. The court explained that the New York State Department
of Taxation and Finance “has chosen not to make any effort
to collect taxes on cigarettes sold from out-of-state to New
York consumers by telephone, mail and Internet.” Id. As
an example of available alternative means for collecting
cigarette excise taxes, the court described the scheme adopted
in California for the collection of taxes and concluded that
“[t]he evidence shows that there are other nondiscriminatory
alternatives to a complete ban on the direct sale of cigarettes.”
Id. at *28. The court then declared that the Statute fails strict
scrutiny and permanently enjoined its enforcement. Id.
III. The Pike Balancing Test
After concluding that the Statute discriminates on its face and
in effect, and thus fails strict scrutiny, the district court also
evaluated the Statute under the more permissive balancing
test we apply to nondiscriminatory statutes that “regulate[ ]
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,”
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct.
844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). Under this test, discussed in
full below, a nondiscriminatory statute that regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local concern “will be
upheld unless the burden [it] impose[s] on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
Id. Referring to its analysis under strict scrutiny, the court
restated its earlier conclusion that the State “ha[s] not proved
that [the Statute] will effect [its] wholly laudable goals,” and
determined that “[o]n balance, then, although ‘designed for
a salutary purpose,’ [the Statute] ‘furthers the purpose so
marginally, and interferes with commerce so substantially,
as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.’ ” Id. (quoting
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,
670, 101 S.Ct. 1309, 67 L.Ed.2d 580 (1981)). The court
therefore concluded that the Statute also fails the Pike
balancing test.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
[1]  [2]  The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8, cl.3. The *208  Clause “has long been
recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of
the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on
[interstate] commerce.” South-Central Timber Dev., Inc., v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 81 L.Ed.2d 71
(1984); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 349-50, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).
Thus, although the Clause is phrased as an affirmative grant
of congressional power, it is well established that it contains a
negative or “dormant” aspect that “denies the States the power
unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate
flow of articles of commerce.” Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Dep't of Envt'l Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128
L.Ed.2d 13 (1994). The fundamental objective of the dormant
Commerce Clause is to “preserv[e] a national market for
competition undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred
by a State upon its residents or resident competitors.” Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136
L.Ed.2d 761 (1997).
[3]  In reviewing whether a statute violates the dormant
Commerce Clause, the “threshold” question we consider
is “whether a state or local government is ‘regulating.’ ”
United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 261 F.3d 245, 254 (2d Cir.2001) (citing C &
A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389,
114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994)), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1082, 122 S.Ct. 815, 151 L.Ed.2d 699 (2002). If a statute
“regulates,” then the second question we examine is whether
the statute, in “regulating,” “affects interstate commerce.”
United Haulers, 261 F.3d at 254. Finally, if a state regulation
“affects” interstate commerce, we must determine “whether
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the regulation discriminates against interstate commerce or
regulates evenhandedly with incidental effects on interstate
commerce.” Id. at 255 (internal citations omitted).
[4]  “[A] state regulates when it exercises governmental
powers that are unavailable to private parties,” such as
the imposition of civil or criminal penalties to compel
behavior. United Haulers, 261 F.3d at 255. Many forms
of regulation have economic effects that extend beyond the
regulating state; a state regulates interstate commerce for
Commerce Clause purposes only when the regulation “affects
interstate commerce,” id. at 254, in a manner either that (i)
discriminates against interstate commerce, or (ii) imposes
burdens on interstate commerce that are incommensurate with
putative local gains.
[5]  [6]  “Legislation that causes certain out-of-state
companies to cease selling in a particular state will not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause as long as other out-
of-state suppliers ‘will ... promptly replace[ ]’ the goods that
would have been sold by the companies that cease selling
in state.” Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127, 98
S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). Accord Tracy, 519 U.S. at
299, 117 S.Ct. 811 (stating that the purpose of the dormant
Commerce Clause is to “preserv[e] a national market for
competition”). Discrimination against commerce itself occurs
when a statute (i) shifts the costs of regulation onto other
states, permitting in-state lawmakers to avoid the costs of
their political decisions, Nat'l Elec. Mfrs' Ass'n v. Sorrell,
272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir.2001); accord United Haulers,
261 F.3d at 261 (stating that a statute “discriminates” when
it “hoards local resources in a manner that favors local
businesses”), (ii) has the practical effect of requiring out-
of-state commerce to be conducted at the regulating state's
direction, Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 110, or (iii) alters the interstate
flow of the goods in question, as distinct from the impact on
companies *209  trading in those goods, Exxon, 437 U.S. at
127, 98 S.Ct. 2207.
[7]  Regulations may discriminate unconstitutionally against
interstate commerce on their face and in their effect. If
a regulation “evince [s]” its discriminatory purposes, or
unambiguously discriminates in its effect, it almost always
is “invalid per se.” Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 108. Statutes that
“evince” discrimination are scrutinized strictly, i.e., “the
burden falls on the State to justify [the discrimination] both
in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and
the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate
to preserve the local interests at stake.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at
353, 97 S.Ct. 2434. The party challenging the validity of a
statute bears the burden of showing that it is discriminatory
and if “discrimination against commerce ... is demonstrated,
the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the
local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability
of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the
local interests at stake.” Id.
[8]  [9]  A statute that does not on its face discriminate
also may run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause if,
in advancing a legitimate local purpose, it imposes burdens
on interstate commerce greater than the local benefits
secured. Significantly incommensurate burdens on interstate
commerce for the putative local purpose sought to be
advanced raise a suspicion of local preference. Such statutes,
although not strictly scrutinized, are evaluated under the
balancing test articulated in Pike. The Pike test evaluates
whether the statute's burdens on interstate commerce are
“clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 90 S.Ct. 844.
This balancing test, however, does not invite courts to
second-guess legislatures by estimating the probable costs
and benefits of the statute, nor is it within the competency
of courts to do so. An “excessive” burden “in relation to”
putative benefits, we elaborated in Sorrell, is a burden on
interstate commerce that is “different from ” the burden
imposed on intrastate commerce. 272 F.3d at 109 (stating
that, “to run afoul of the Pike standard, the statute ...
must impose a burden on interstate commerce that is
qualitatively or quantitatively different from that imposed on
intrastate commerce”). Under Sorrell, a burden that seems
incommensurate to the statute's gains survives Pike as long
as it affects intrastate and interstate interests similarly-the
similar effect on interstate and intrastate interests assuaging
the concern that the statute is designed to favor local interests.
[10]  We review de novo whether a statute as a matter of
law discriminates on its face or in its effect. Whether a statute
discriminates impermissibly against interstate commerce is a
mixed question of law and fact that we also review de novo.
Scribner v. Summers, 84 F.3d 554, 557 (2d Cir.1996) (stating
that “the de novo standard is equally applicable to so called
mixed questions of law and fact”).
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II. Analysis of the Statute
A. Facial Discrimination
The State argues that the district court erred in finding that
the Statute facially discriminates against interstate commerce.
We agree.
[11]  The court articulated two bases for its finding of
facial discrimination: that the Statute (1) limits retail cigarette
sales to in-state, face-to-face transactions, and (2) permits in-
state brick-and-mortar businesses to circumvent the Statute's
prohibition on delivering cigarettes to residences, causing the
Statute's burdens to fall almost *210  exclusively on out-of-
state cigarette sellers. As we explain below, however, neither
the Statute's closure of a sales channel for retail cigarette sales
nor the Statute's delivery exemption discriminates against
interstate commerce, facially or otherwise.
1. Limiting Sales to In-State, Face-to-Face Transactions
The district court stated that although the Statute's
“prohibitions apply to all direct sellers, the law, on its face,
discriminates against interstate commerce by requiring that
retail sales take place only in-state.” Santa Fe, 2001 WL
636441, at *13. This determination is flawed in two respects.
First, the district court erred in finding “facial” discrimination
based upon its interpretation of the Statute's effects. Second,
the district court concluded that the Statute is invalid in
large part based upon its analogy to a significantly different
statute in an inapposite case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399
(1994).
First, the district court conducted a “facial” analysis by
examining the Statute's effects, thereby conflating two
of the three inquiries relevant to determining whether
a challenged statute or regulation discriminates against
interstate commerce. The court stated that the Statute
“requir[es] that retail sales take place only in-state,” Santa Fe,
2001 WL 636441, at *13. The Statute by its terms, however,
does not impose such a requirement; it merely prohibits
cigarette sellers from shipping, and common and contract
carriers and others from transporting, cigarettes directly to
New York consumers. Therefore, the court's determination
that the Statute forces all retail sales of cigarettes to occur
in the state can only be the result of its interpretation of the
Statute's operation, or effect, rather than its terms.
Second, in reaching its conclusion the court relied solely on
C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d
399. This reliance was misplaced because Carbone is easily
distinguishable from the case at bar. Carbone involved a local
ordinance that by its terms required all solid waste leaving
the municipality to be processed at a single designated facility
in the town. Id. at 386-87, 114 S.Ct. 1677. This requirement
applied to all other solid waste processing facilities regardless
of their location, i.e., all solid waste leaving the municipality
had to be processed at the designated in-town facility whether
it came from out-of-state facilities, in-state facilities, or even
other in-town facilities. Id. at 390, 114 S.Ct. 1677. The stated
purpose of the ordinance was to finance the $1.4 million it
cost to construct the facility. Id. at 386-87, 114 S.Ct. 1677.
This brief recitation of Carbone 's facts demonstrates its
inapplicability to our case.
The ordinance in Carbone discriminated on its face against
commerce because, although it applied to all other solid waste
processing facilities, it favored, in a blatantly protectionist
manner, one particular local facility to the detriment of
all others. Id. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 1677 (“The flow control
ordinance discriminates, for it allows only the favored
operator to process waste that is within the limits of the
town.”). Thus, the ordinance did not regulate all processing
facilities evenhandedly because it singled out for preferential
treatment one local facility. That distinction demonstrated its
facial discrimination. In contrast, the Statute at issue here
does not by its terms make any such distinction; it does not
on its face prefer either a particular in-state direct shipper of
cigarettes or in-state direct shippers generally. Rather, by its
terms, the Statute regulates evenhandedly *211  the sale of
cigarettes to New York consumers by all direct shippers and
transporters regardless of where they are located.
The court cited Carbone for the proposition that “a law may
be discriminatory even though it limits activities of in-state
as well as out-of-state business.” Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441,
at *13. While the Court in Carbone did note that “[t]he
ordinance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-
town processors are also covered by the prohibition,” 511
U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 1677, the district court here failed to
recognize that this statement was made within the context of
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the Court's analysis of the ordinance's discriminatory effects.
Id. at 390-91, 114 S.Ct. 1677.
2. The Delivery Exception
The district court's second basis for finding facial
discrimination is the so-called delivery exception of
subdivision two. Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441, at *13. Again,
the court erred because it relied on the exception's effect,
rather than its terms, in reaching its conclusion. The court
found that “the statute discriminates on its face against
interstate commerce by providing a delivery exemption
for New York brick-and-mortar businesses with their own
delivery services.” Id. at *14. The exception, on its face, does
no such thing. Instead, it permits any person, other than a
common or contract carrier, to transport up to four cartons
of cigarettes at any one time to any one person in New
York State. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll (2). Whether
the district court is correct regarding which businesses would
and would not be able to take advantage of the exception,
and therefore whether it discriminates against interstate
commerce, is also a question of the exception's effect.
Santa Fe claims that “the cases finding facial discrimination
do not depend on formalisms such as the particular language
a statute uses to work its discrimination.” Santa Fe is
mistaken. The cases cited by Plaintiffs undermine their
contention because all do, in fact, rely on “the particular
language” of the statute or regulation at issue. In South-
Central Timber, the statute, as characterized by B & W,
“require[d] that timber taken from state lands be processed
within the state.” (emphasis added). Thus, the “particular
language” of the statute demonstrated its facial discrimination
because by its very terms it made a geographical distinction
in favor of in-state businesses by requiring that a commercial
activity be conducted within the state. The same is true with
the remaining cases cited by the Plaintiffs. See SSC Corp.
v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir.1995) (finding
facial discrimination where flow ordinance required all town
waste be directed to a single local disposal facility); Stephen
D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste
Management Corp., 770 F.Supp. 775, 783 (D.R.I.) (finding
facial discrimination where regulation required that all waste
collected in the state be processed by in-state facilities), aff'd,
947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir.1991).
The Statute at issue in this case does not on its face limit
any commercial activity to in-state or local transactions.
Instead, by its terms, the Statute prohibits all direct shipments
of cigarettes to New York consumers, whether the direct
shippers be located within or without the state, with the
limited exception that any person, again whether located
within or without the state, may transport to a New York
consumer up to four cartons of cigarettes by means other
than that of a common or contract carrier. We decline to look
beyond the “particular language” of the Statute in determining
whether it is facially discriminatory because to do so would
collapse the facial and effects analyses into *212  one
inquiry. We conclude that no reading of the language of the
Statute supports the conclusion that it discriminates against
interstate commerce on its face.
B. Discrimination in Effect
A statute or regulation may also be subject to strict scrutiny
if it discriminates against interstate commerce in effect.
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455, 112 S.Ct. 789, 117
L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). The district court concluded that in addition
to facial discrimination, the Statute also discriminates against
interstate commerce in effect. Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441, at
*16-17. We disagree.
[12]  The court articulated the same two bases for its
conclusion that the Statute in effect is discriminatory: (1)
the retail cigarette market is effectively limited to in-
state businesses, and (2) the delivery exception is likewise
effectively limited to in-state brick-and-mortar outlets.
1. Limiting Sales to In-State, Face-to-Face Transactions
Following its citation to the Statute, the district court observed
that “[t]he only way an out-of-state seller could legally sell
retail cigarettes to New York consumers under [the Statute]
is to establish a brick-and-mortar outlet in New York”.
Id. at *16. The district court then credited the Plaintiffs'
testimony that “establishing in-state brick-and-mortar outlets
by plaintiffs would be ‘unworkable’ and ‘uneconomic,’ ” and
therefore the court concluded that “the effect of [the Statute]
is to eliminate out-of-state direct sales retailers from the
market by requiring face-to-face, in-state retail sales only.”
Id. (internal citation omitted). Both the court's reasoning and
conclusion are flawed in a number of respects.
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First, even assuming the district court is correct that “[t]he
only way an out-of-state seller could legally sell retail
cigarettes to New York consumers ... is to establish a
brick-and-mortar outlet in New York,” id., the same is true
for in-state direct shippers. Thus, that consequence applies
evenhandedly to both out-of-state and in-state direct cigarette
shippers and therefore does not discriminate against those
located outside New York State.
Second, even if the Plaintiffs' evidence did demonstrate
that it would be “unworkable” and “uneconomic” for them
to establish brick-and-mortar outlets in New York, that is
insufficient to establish a discriminatory effect. See Exxon,
437 U.S. at 127, 98 S.Ct. 2207 (finding that evidence which
showed that at least three companies would be unable to
continue doing business in the state as a result of the statute at
issue did not constitute an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce). “The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls
on some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a
claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.” Id. at
126, 98 S.Ct. 2207.
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that any alleged
hardship would be borne disproportionately by out-of-state
direct cigarette shippers. In other words, an in-state direct
shipper of cigarettes may well face the same difficulties as the
out-of-state shipper. For instance, an individual or business
operating an Internet, phone, or mail order direct cigarette
sale business in New York State would also be required
to establish a brick-and-mortar outlet in order to sell retail
cigarettes directly to consumers. The Plaintiffs, who bear the
burden of showing a discriminatory effect, have not shown
that establishment of a brick-and-mortar outlet would not
also be “unworkable” and “uneconomic” for an in-state direct
shipper. Rather, they simply rely on evidence demonstrating
that they themselves would face significant *213  difficulties
in establishing a retail outlet in New York.
The fact that these particular Plaintiffs may be priced out of
the retail cigarette market does not establish a discriminatory
effect. As the Exxon Court noted, “[t]he source of the
consumers' supply [of petroleum] may switch from [one
group of suppliers to another], but interstate commerce is
not subjected to an impermissible burden simply because
an otherwise valid regulation causes some business to shift
from one interstate supplier to another.” Id. at 127, 98 S.Ct.
2207. This is so because “the Clause protects the interstate
market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or
burdensome regulations.” Id. at 127-28, 98 S.Ct. 2207.
Third, the district court's conclusion that “the effect of [the
Statute] is to eliminate out-of-state direct sales retailers from
the market by requiring face-to-face, in-state retail sales
only,” Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441, at *16, is only partially
accurate: the effect of the Statute is to eliminate all sales
of cigarettes to New York consumers that do not involve
face-to-face sales or the transportation of fewer than four
cartons of cigarettes to any one consumer. Indeed, that is
the goal of the Statute. Thus, the Statute merely prohibits
one manner in which cigarettes could otherwise be sold
to New York consumers, namely through direct shipments.
“We cannot ... accept [Plaintiffs'] underlying notion that the
Commerce Clause protects the particular structure or methods
of operation in a retail market.” Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127, 98
S.Ct. 2207.
Fourth, the district court's citations to Halliburton Oil, 373
U.S. at 72, 83 S.Ct. 1201, and South-Central Timber, 467
U.S. at 100, 104 S.Ct. 2237, for the proposition that “[a]
state may not require an out-of-state operator ‘to become a
resident in order to compete on equal terms,’ ” are misplaced.
Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441, at *16. Halliburton involved a
Louisiana statute that imposed a greater tax burden on out-
of-state businesses than similarly situated in-state businesses.
Id. at 70-71, 83 S.Ct. 1201. The Supreme Court observed that
“[i]f Louisiana were the only State to impose an additional
tax burden for such out-of-state operations, the disparate
treatment would be an incentive to locate within Louisiana ...
in order to compete on equal terms.” Id. at 72, 83 S.Ct.
1201. The statute challenged in Halliburton, unlike the
Statute at issue here, imposed a tax burden on out-of-state
businesses but not on their in-state counterparts. Thus, it was
discriminatory on its face. In our case, in-state direct shippers
would also be required to establish brick-and-mortar outlets
in order to sell cigarettes to New York consumers and the
Statute therefore is not discriminatory against out-of-state
direct sellers.
In South-Central Timber, the Court stated that it “view[s]
with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business
operations to be performed in the home State that could more
efficiently be performed elsewhere.” 467 U.S. at 100, 104
S.Ct. 2237 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 145, 90 S.Ct. 844).
In that case, Alaska imposed a requirement that all timber
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taken from lands within the state be processed in the state
prior to exportation. Id. at 84, 104 S.Ct. 2237. The Court
in South-Central Timber characterized the regulation as “a
naked restraint on export of unprocessed logs.” Id. at 99, 104
S.Ct. 2237. The Statute challenged here is not analogous to
the regulation in South-Central Timber because (1) it does
not mandate that out-of-state businesses conduct a given
commercial activity within New York State; (2) it does not
restrain the flow of goods into New York; and (3) it does
not distinguish between out-of-state and in-state direct *214
shippers. It merely requires that cigarettes sales to New York
consumers be conducted in such a way that age can be verified
and tax collected, a requirement that applies to all direct
shippers of cigarettes wherever they may be located.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Statute at issue
neither impedes nor obstructs the flow of cigarettes in
interstate commerce. Cigarettes will continue to flow into
New York State in the same manner they always have.
The Statute does not prohibit New York consumers' access
to cigarettes; again, it merely requires that they purchase
cigarettes in a manner that allows the seller to verify
the buyer's age and to collect the state excise tax. As in
Exxon, “[t]he crux of [Plaintiffs'] claim is that, regardless of
whether the State has interfered with the movement of goods
in interstate commerce, it has interfered ‘with the natural
functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition
or through burdensome regulation.’ ” 437 U.S. at 127, 98
S.Ct. 2207 (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 806, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976)). The
Supreme Court in Exxon rejected that argument, as do we
here.
2. Delivery Exception
The district court also found that the delivery exception
has a discriminatory effect. Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441, at
*16. We disagree with this conclusion as well. The State
reiterates on appeal its argument that the exception only
permits individual consumers, rather than brick-and-mortar
retailers, to transport up to four cartons of cigarettes. We
reject this restrictive interpretation and agree with the district
court that the delivery exception applies to all transporters of
cigarettes, except common or contract carriers. In reaching
this conclusion, we adopt the district court's observation that
there “is nothing in the language of the statute that limits [the
exemption] to consumers. If the Legislature had wanted to
restrict the exemption [only] to individual consumers ..., it
could easily have defined the exemption accordingly.” Santa
Fe, 2001 WL 636441, at *14.
Subdivision two prohibits the “transport” of cigarettes by
common or contract carriers to anyone in New York other
than licensed cigarette tax agents, licensed dealers, export
warehouse proprietors, customs bonded warehouses, or state
and federal officials acting in furtherance of their duties.
This subdivision also prohibits the “transport” of cigarettes
by “any other person” to anyone other than persons in
the permitted categories set out in the previous sentence.
However, with respect to “any other person,” subdivision two
creates an exception for the “transporting” of “not more than
eight hundred cigarettes at any one time to any person in this
state.” Subdivision one prohibits “any person engaged in the
business of selling cigarettes” from “ship[ping] or caus[ing]
to be shipped” any quantity of cigarettes to “any person”
in New York who is not included in one of the permitted
categories.
Judge Cabranes posits that subdivision one, which prohibits
shipping, somehow limits the reach of subdivision
two's “transporting” exception to individual purchasers
of cigarettes. He does so despite the apparently broad
applicability of subdivision two to any person other than
a common or contract carrier by distorting the commonly
accepted meaning of “ship,” so that it means the same thing
as “transport.” The first two definitions of “ship” listed in
a commonly accepted dictionary are “to place or receive
on board of a ship for transportation by water ...” and “to
cause to be transported.” Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2096 (1993). *215  Both definitions connote one
actor causing another to transport something. The action of a
retailer who drives her delivery van to a long-term customer's
house does not fall comfortably within either definition. We
would not say of this retailer, “she shipped 800 cigarettes to
Mr. Jones in her delivery van.” Instead we would say that the
retailer transported or carried the cigarettes to her customer.
See id. at 2430 (listing “carry” as a synonym for “transport”).
Because Section 1399-ll is a penal statute, one should not read
“ship” in such a distorted fashion. Judge Cabranes' reading
would subject to criminal liability, see N.Y. Pub. Health L.
§ 1399-ll (5), small retailers who, in reliance on the common
sense meaning of “ship” as it is used in subdivision one
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and in subdivision two's exception, carry small quantities of
cigarettes to customers in their own delivery vans.
The district court found, and we agree, that the organization
representing grocery stores in New York supported Section
1399-ll based, in part, on its understanding that a de minimis
exception existed for the transportation of small quantities
of cigarettes by cigarette sellers. See Santa Fe, 2001 WL
636441, at *14 & n. 25 (citing letter dated July 18, 2000,
from Michael Rosen, Vice President and General Counsel of
the Food Industry Alliance, to James M. McGuire, Counsel
to the Governor, Pl.Ex. 211, Tab 32). Thus, it is probable
that individual grocers would adopt our understanding of the
statute and, under Judge Cabranes' interpretation, be subject
to prosecution. Finding no basis for the State's interpretation
of the subdivision two exception, we reject that interpretation.
Although we agree with the district court's interpretation of
the delivery exception, for the reasons discussed below, we
find that the exception does not in effect discriminate against
interstate commerce. The district court credited the testimony
of Robin Sommers, the President and Chief Executive Officer
of Santa Fe, who, according to the district court, testified
“that it is not economically feasible for interstate companies
to make deliveries to New York customers using their own
trucks.” Id. The court also credited the testimony of an expert
for the Plaintiffs who explained that
doing the delivery themselves just
means that they are becoming a
common carrier [and] economically
they have to have the same [cost]-
structure as a common carrier in order
to compete in-state. If for some reason
or another they can't deliver in the
state at a cost that is similar to the
common carrier, if they have to have
a courier come from the retailer who
is employed by the retailer, then make
a face-to-face transaction at the house,
that is the same as a ban because
that's going to be cost-prohibitive.
That's going to be, you can always get
the same effect as a ban by making
something so costly that nobody is
going to do it.
Id. The court then stated, quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350-51,
97 S.Ct. 2434, that “the statute's consequence of raising the
costs of doing business in the New York market for interstate
sellers, while leaving those of their New York counterparts
unaffected, ... has the practical effect of not only burdening
interstate sales ... but discriminating against them.” Santa Fe,
2001 WL 636441, at *17 (alterations omitted). The district
court's conclusion is erroneous.
First, the exercise of the delivery exception does not leave
“unaffected” the Plaintiffs' New York counterparts. The
Plaintiffs' in-state counterparts are not New York brick-and-
mortar retail outlets that *216  sell cigarettes; rather, they are
non-brick-and-mortar sellers who ship cigarettes directly to
New York consumers following purchases made by Internet,
telephone, or mail order. See Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't
of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir.2001) (“The [Supreme]
Court's jurisprudence finds discrimination only when a State
discriminates among similarly situated in-state and out-of-
state interests.”).
Second, in order to show a discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Statute
confers on their in-state counterparts a competitive advantage.
The Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this burden merely by showing
the difficulties they themselves would face in their efforts to
continue selling cigarettes directly to New York consumers
under the terms of the delivery exception. In other words,
it may also not be economically viable for in-state direct
shippers to “make deliveries to New York customers using
their own trucks.” Id. at *16.
A similarly situated in-state direct shipper who, for instance,
currently receives cigarette orders on his website and then
ships cigarettes directly to the buyer's residence, would also
be required under the exception to maintain his own fleet
of delivery trucks, employ drivers, and undertake any other
necessary investment just as would the out-of-state direct
shipper. The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how or in
what manner such an undertaking would be less onerous
for their in-state counterparts. Even if the Plaintiffs' in-
state counterparts include brick-and-mortar retail outlets, the
delivery exception would only benefit those that already have
a delivery system in place. The Plaintiffs have not introduced
evidence indicating what portion of brick-and-mortar retail
cigarette sellers currently offer delivery services. Thus, we are
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unable to conduct a comparative analysis of the advantages
and disadvantages of the delivery exception to in-state as
opposed to out-of-state sellers even were we to consider
in-state brick-and-mortar outlets to be counterparts to the
Plaintiffs. One can surely imagine, however, that of all in-
state retail cigarette sellers, only a small percentage offer
delivery service to their customers.
In any event, to the extent that, for instance, a grocery store
that currently delivers goods to its customers is permitted to
include in a delivery up to four cartons of cigarettes, we find
that de minimis advantage to in-state brick-and-mortar retail
sellers insufficient to establish a discriminatory effect. See
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 349, 97 S.Ct. 2434 (“[N]ot every exercise
of state authority imposing some burden on the free flow of
commerce is invalid.”).
Where a state restriction affecting commerce applies
evenhandedly to both in-state and out-of-state businesses and
does not impede the flow of goods in interstate commerce, the
restriction neither discriminates against out-of-state entities
nor unjustifiably burdens interstate commerce. For the
reasons stated above, we conclude that the Statute is not
discriminatory either on its face or in effect but instead has
only incidental effects on interstate commerce. We therefore
analyze its constitutionality under the test established in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d
174 (1970).
III. The Pike Balancing Test
[13]  Pike instructs that “[w]here the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
397 U.S. at 142, 90 S.Ct. 844. The Statute at issue passes
constitutional muster under Pike because the regulation
*217  of the importation and sale of cigarettes, even if
this regulation discourages the importation of cigarettes, was
recognized by the Supreme Court in Austin v. Tennessee, 179
U.S. 343, 348-49, 21 S.Ct. 132, 45 L.Ed. 224 (1900), as a
legitimate exercise of state power in the public interest, id.,
and because the Statute's burdens on interstate commerce are
not excessive relative to its local benefits.
The district court's conclusion that the Statute violates the
Commerce Clause under Pike scrutiny was based on its
determination that the Statute “directly and substantially
burdens interstate commerce and isolates New York from
the national cigarette market.” Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441,
at *29. We have concluded that these determinations
are erroneous. As discussed above, the Statute, at most,
incidentally affects interstate commerce by prohibiting one
method for selling cigarettes to New York consumers.
Moreover, the Statute in no way isolates New York from
the national cigarette market because it does not obstruct or
impede the flow of cigarettes into New York State. Because
the Statute's effects on interstate commerce are de minimis,
we find that they are not “clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.” Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 90 S.Ct. 844.
The parties do not dispute the district court's finding that the
State has a legitimate interest in “reduc[ing] minors' access
to cigarettes through direct sales channels and ... reduc[ing]
cigarette consumption by requiring consumers to pay New
York's high excise taxes.” Id. at *29. The district court cited
evidence submitted by a Plaintiffs' expert showing that in
1999 “1.9% of all surveyed youth smokers who purchased
cigarettes did so through the mail.” Id. at *18. Although the
court cited this evidence in support of its conclusion that
the State failed to demonstrate “that minors use direct sales
channels to a significant degree,” id., we find that because the
Statute has only de minimis effects on interstate commerce,
the prevention of even this small percentage of cigarette sales
to minors constitutes a putative local benefit that is sufficient
to survive the Pike balancing test. See Ford, 264 F.3d at 503
(“Consistent with the use of the term ‘putative’ in the Pike
balancing, this Court will not ‘second guess the empirical
judgment of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation).’
” (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 92,
107 S.Ct. 1637, 95 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987)). Moreover, we are
particularly persuaded that this evidence tips the balance in
the State's favor in light of the pernicious effects of cigarette
smoking and the possibility that purchasers of any age may
supply youthful smokers who do not themselves purchase
through direct channels.
The district court also concluded that the State “demonstrated
that an increase in the price of cigarettes will lead to a decrease
in the demand of cigarettes.” Id. at *25. This local benefit,
consisting of lower consumption with concomitant benefits to
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health, is certainly not outweighed by the Statute's de minimis
effect on interstate commerce.
With respect to both of these “wholly laudable goals,”
id. at *29, the district court concluded that neither would
be “meaningfully address[ed]” by the Statute because of
“loopholes which are fatal to its effectiveness.” Id. at *20. We
disagree with the weight the court afforded these supposed
“loopholes” and find that, to the extent they exist, they are not
significant enough to undercut the Statute's effectiveness.
A. The Statute's Alleged “Loopholes”
1. The Delivery Exception
The district court cited the delivery exception in its discussion
of the loopholes *218  that would permit minors to continue
purchasing cigarettes “without an in-store, face-to-face
transaction.” Id. The court did not expressly indicate in what
way or to what extent minors would take advantage of this
so-called exception nor did it cite any evidence showing that
minors currently avoid face-to-face transactions by making
such purchases. We need not make such determinations,
however, because we find that even if minors were to
purchase cigarettes in this manner, this exception nonetheless
furthers one of the Statute's two goals: to reduce demand for
cigarettes by requiring that purchasers pay New York's high
cigarette excise tax. 2
2 Judge Cabranes contends that if subdivision two allows
retailers to deliver small quantities of cigarettes to
individual consumers, it cannot survive Pike balancing
because the exception actually undermines rather than
serves the statute's goals. Even assuming, and we do
not, that the exception undermines the goals of reducing
consumption of cigarettes to minors, it serves the goal
of reducing general demand for cigarettes by collection
of New York's high excise tax as well as does an in-
store sale. Ordinary retailers, whether they sell in the
store or by delivery to a home, are required to collect
the applicable cigarette taxes. It is much more difficult to
collect taxes from consumers who order on the Internet
or by telephone.
2. Sales by Indian Nations
The district court also concluded that the Statute's goals
would be undermined by cigarette sales by Indian nations.
Id. at *20, *26. The court found that “no enforcement efforts
under [the Statute] will be directed to direct sellers on Indian
reservations.” Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441, at *8. The court
based this determination on a failed attempt by the state to
collect excise and sales taxes from on-reservation cigarette
sales in 1997, and assertions made by Indian nations upon
passage of the Statute at issue that they “would continue to
sell and deliver tax-free cigarettes without interference.” Id.
We find the district court's conclusion both speculative and
contradicted by the evidence.
As enforcement of the Statute was preliminarily enjoined, the
State's resolve to enforce its prohibitions has not yet been
tested. Further, the State submitted evidence that, because of
Indian sovereignty, the Statute would not apply to “[s]ales
and shipments of cigarettes to ... [1] recognized Indian nations
or tribes, [2] Indian-run businesses on reservations in New
York State, or [3] Indian consumers residing on reservations
in New York State.” The State did explain, “[h]owever,
[that the Statute] do[es] apply to shipments of cigarettes by
Indian nations, tribes, and businesses to any person other than
recognized Indian nations or tribes, Indian-run businesses on
reservations or Indian consumers residing on reservations in
New York State.” (emphases added).
Thus, the State retains significant enforcement powers with
respect to Indian-related sales despite the fact that it is
prohibited from enforcing the Statute against Indian sellers
in the three circumstances noted above. We do not view
these narrow limitations on the State's enforcement power as
constituting a “loophole” in the Statute so significant as to be
“fatal to its effectiveness.” Id. at *20. The State argues that
it intends to enforce the Statute's provisions against Indian
sellers to the extent it is legally able to do so, and we see
no reason to doubt the veracity of this contention before the
State has had an opportunity to attempt such enforcement.
Cf. ILGWU v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 821 (D.C.Cir.1983)
(“[C]ourt[s] must be particularly deferential when reviewing
an agency's predictive judgments about areas that are within
the agency's field of discretion and expertise.”).
*219  Furthermore, because subdivision two of the Statute
penalizes independently entities that deliver cigarettes
directly to New York consumers, even if the State chose not to
enforce the Statute against Indian sellers themselves, it could
without limitation enforce that provision against carriers that
transport cigarettes from Indian reservations to New York
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consumers, thereby effectively cutting off the usefulness of
this potential “loophole.”
3. Deliveries by the United States Postal Service
The district court also found that because the State is without
authority to dictate what the United States Postal Service
may or may not ship, this fact likewise “make[s] the law
ineffective in stopping minors from accessing cigarettes,”
id. at *20, and “prevent[ing] smokers from obtaining lower-
priced cigarettes,” id. at *26. This conclusion is based on a
misinterpretation of the Statute.
Subdivision one prohibits “any person” from “ship[ping] or
caus[ing] to be shipped” cigarettes to New York consumers
directly. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll (1). This means that
direct shippers are subject to the Statute's civil and criminal
penalties regardless of what means of transport they use to
deliver the cigarettes. Subdivision two imposes the same
penalties on those entities that transport cigarettes directly
to New York consumers. To the extent that the State cannot
enforce the Statute against the United States Postal Service,
it is only without authority to penalize it for violations of
subdivision two. In other words, while the State cannot
prosecute the Postal Service itself for transporting cigarettes
directly to New York consumers under subdivision two, it
can prosecute direct shippers for shipping cigarettes to New
York consumers through the Postal Service under subdivision
one. Thus, under a proper reading of the Statute, this alleged
loophole is not “fatal to its effectiveness,” id. at *20, because
it is, in practice, nonexistent.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Statute's de minimis
burden on interstate commerce is not “clearly excessive in
relation to the local putative benefits,” Pike, 397 U.S. at 142,
90 S.Ct. 844, and that the Statute therefore survives Pike
scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
We find that the Statute does not discriminate against
interstate commerce and therefore is not subject to strict
scrutiny. To the extent that the Statute burdens interstate
commerce, that burden is significantly outweighed by the
Statute's putative local benefits and therefore does not violate
the Commerce Clause. Thus, the judgment of the district court
is reversed, with directions to enter judgment for the State.
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge, concurring in the
judgment on separate grounds:
Insofar as the Court holds that the Statute does not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause I concur, but I respectfully
dissent from the majority's interpretation of the Statute to
permit home deliveries by local traditional retailers.
The majority opinion rests on an inventive distinction by
the District Court between so-called “direct” cigarette sellers
and so-called “traditional” or “bricks-and-mortar” cigarette
sellers, holding that the Statute prohibits direct sellers from
making home deliveries of cigarettes but permits traditional
retailers to do so. 1  The majority further holds that the
Statute prohibits cigarettes from being delivered *220  to
homes by third-party carriers (i.e., trucking and mailing
services), but permits cigarettes to be delivered to homes
by traditional cigarette sellers' first-party (i.e., proprietary)
delivery services. Both distinctions are judicial creations. The
Statute itself does not differentiate between different types
of cigarette sellers. It instead provides penalties for home
delivery of cigarettes by “any person engaged in the business
of selling cigarettes.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll (1).
The Statute itself also does not even mention-much less
distinguish between-third-party and first-party carriers, or in
any other way create differential permissibility of cigarette
home delivery based on the ownership of the means of
transport.
1 For consistency with the majority opinion, I adopt this
nomenclature.
The majority provides no support for these confected
distinctions, much less for the different legal consequences
based on type of cigarette seller and type of transport that
flow from these distinctions under the majority's reading of
the Statute. I therefore dissent from the majority's reading of
the Statute and its reasoning about the Statute's application.
I also dissent from the majority's interpretation of the Statute's
so-called “delivery exemption” as permitting local cigarette
retailers to make home deliveries of cigarettes, and from
the majority's conclusion that such favoritism toward local
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interests-without discernable benefits to the public and in
complete abrogation of the Statute's stated purpose of making
every cigarette sale a face-to-face sale-would not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause. I instead read the exemption as
a personal use exemption that (i) permits individuals to take
cigarettes home from the store without facing the Statute's
civil and criminal penalties for “transporting” cigarettes,
and (ii) prohibits “any person engaged in the business of
selling cigarettes,” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll (1), from
delivering cigarettes to a consumer's house, regardless of how
that “person” or entity causes the cigarettes to arrive there.
Based on a significantly different, plain-text reading of the
Statute, I concur in the judgment of the Court that the Statute
does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. I also join the
majority in its description of the history and purpose of the
Statute and its statement of the relevant law.
* * * * * *
The Statute and the issues at the heart of this case both are
fairly simple. The Statute, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll,
requires that all purchases of cigarettes in the State of New
York take place through a face-to-face transaction. Face-
to-face transactions, according to evidence credited by the
District Court and the majority, permit vendors to verify the
purchaser's age in ways that on-line or telephone transactions
do not-that is, in a face-to-face transaction, the vendor can
look at the purchaser to see how old he or she is and can
inspect photo identification.
Age verification is important to the State of New York not
only to discourage underage smoking but also to ensure the
State's continued receipt of certain federal block grants that,
under the so-called Synar Amendment, go to the State only
if it achieves specific targets in reducing cigarette sales to
underage consumers. See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (2000). For
this reason, New York has an active program of combating
underage tobacco sales. This program principally is directed
at ensuring vendor compliance with age checks during face-
to-face sales. There is no equivalent mechanism for ensuring
age verification in cigarette sales that do not take place in
person but that instead take place over the telephone or
internet. The State also has *221  an interest in promoting
face-to-face sales because direct retailers (retailers who sell
cigarettes over the telephone or internet), generally fail to
collect the State's high per-pack excise tax.
The panel unanimously agrees that the State has the authority
to regulate the sale of cigarettes to require that all cigarette
sales take place through a face-to-face transaction. To
summarize the majority's position, which I join, the State may
require that all cigarettes sold in New York be sold in face-
to-face transactions, even if this regulation means that direct
retailers no longer can sell cigarettes to New York consumers,
because such a regulation is even-handed as between in-state
and out-of-state direct retailers. Furthermore, to whatever
incidental extent (if at all) such a regulation would burden the
interstate commerce in cigarettes, the burden is outweighed
by the regulation's significant public purpose.
Where the majority and I part company is on the question
of whether the Statute permits traditional retailers-that is, so-
called “bricks-and-mortar” retailers that operate stores-to sell
cigarettes through non-face-to-face transactions and make
home deliveries of cigarettes so purchased. In other words,
does the Statute permit traditional retailers to behave as if
they were direct retailers, making the non-age-verified sales
and home deliveries that the Statute aims to prohibit? The
majority believes that it does, but I believe not, based on the
text of the Statute.
Further, were the Statute to favor traditional retailers in this
way, I believe that the Statute would fail the Pike balancing
test. It would fail the Pike balancing test not because it would
favor one type of retailer over the other-traditional retailers
versus direct retailers 2 -but because it would favor in-state
interests over out-of-state interests while giving up most of
the benefit that the Statute aims to secure.
2 If the Statute were to discriminate between direct
retailers and traditional retailers, without regard to their
location, then direct retailers might have an equal
protection claim but not a dormant Commerce Clause
claim.
The majority interprets the Statute in a way that would favor
local interests because of its interpretation of the terms “ship”
and “transport” to permit the delivery of cigarettes to a home
only by use of a retailer's own short-haul delivery service
(e.g., a delivery man) but not by a commercial transport
company or the United States postal service.
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I read the Statute's plain language to prohibit evenhandedly
all non-face-to-face sales and home deliveries of cigarettes
by all in-state and out-of-state traditional and direct retailers,
including bricks-and-mortar retailers using their own delivery
services, the reading of the Statute urged by the State of
New York. 3  I conclude that this blanket prohibition would
survive the Pike balancing test because it would burden
in-state and out-of-state interests equally in furtherance of
the Statute's anticipated benefits-reducing minors' access to
cigarettes, ensuring continued receipt of federal block grants,
and facilitating collection of the state's cigarette excise tax-
and would fall within the traditional police power of the
states to regulate the sale of *222  tobacco under Austin v.
Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 21 S.Ct. 132, 45 L.Ed. 224 (1900),
as discussed by the majority in Section III of its Discussion.
3 The State of New York never argued that the Statute
would be constitutional if, as interpreted by the majority,
it permitted home deliveries by in-state traditional
retailers but not by any other cigarette retailers. Instead,
the State argued that the Statute prohibits all home
deliveries. In the alternative, the State argued that if this
Court were to find that the exemption in Subdivision
2 permits home deliveries by traditional retailers using
their own delivery services, that it should sever the
exemption from the Statute to preserve the Statute's
constitutionality.
1. Analysis of the Statute's text
There is no basis in the text of the Statute upon which
to conclude that the so-called “delivery exemption” in
Subdivision 2 permits local brick-and-mortar retailers to
make home deliveries. When read in conjunction with
Subdivision 1, Subdivision 2 proscribes deliveries to homes
and residences by any cigarette retailer, including bricks-and-
mortar retailers using proprietary delivery services.
Subdivision 1 addresses businesses that sell cigarettes. It
states, in pertinent part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in the business of selling cigarettes to ship or
cause to be shipped any cigarettes to any person in this state”
at their home or residence. N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 1399-ll
(1) (emphasis added). Subdivision 1 thus plainly prohibits
“any person engaged in the business of selling cigarettes”
from “ship[ping] or causing to [be] shipped” cigarettes to
“any person” at their home or residence. Id.
“Ship” means “to transport, or commit for transportation.”
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 781 (1956); see
also The American Heritage Dictionary 1130 (2d College
ed.1991) (“to send or cause to be transported”). “Ship” also
may mean “to take or place on board a ship.” American
Heritage Dictionary, ante. Because the Statute bars the home
delivery of cigarettes, and very few homes in New York state
are accessible by water, we need not consider if “ship” here
refers to the transport of articles by water. Therefore, “ship”
must have the ordinary meanings of “to transport, or commit
for transportation” or “to send or cause to be transported.” 4
4 The majority, after quoting several standard dictionaries'
definitions of “ship,” states that the definitions “connote
one actor causing another to transport something.”
Majority Op. at II.B.2 of its Discussion Section.
However, this interpretation of “ship” exclusively to
require one actor to commit goods to another actor for
transport is an ad hoc embroiderment by the majority
on these standard definitions. No standard definition of
“ship,” whether cited by the majority or cited separately
above, specifies that a third party must transport the
goods. It is fully consistent with definitions of “ship” that
a party sending goods from one place to another using its
own vehicles is “ship[ping]” the goods. The majority's
reading of the delivery exemption depends on defining
“ship” exclusively to mean sending goods by third party
(thereby permitting traditional retailers to make home
deliveries with their own vehicles because, absent the
use of a third-party service, such deliveries would not be
“ship[ments]”). This is a possible meaning of “ship,” but
it is not the plain or necessary meaning, nor is it the most
reasonable meaning in the context of the Statute.
A bricks-and-mortar retailer of cigarettes (the majority
does not dispute) is a “person engaged in the business of
selling cigarettes.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll (1). A
retailer delivering cigarettes to a home-pursuant to a sale
and by means of that business's delivery service-would be
“transport[ing]” or “send[ing]” them. Therefore, a bricks-
and-mortar retailer delivering cigarettes to a home plainly
would violate Subdivision 1 of the Statute.
Subdivision 2 addresses transportation companies,
proscribing them from knowingly delivering cigarettes to a
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home. It states, in pertinent part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful
for any common or contract carrier to knowingly transport
cigarettes to any person in this state reasonably believed
by such carrier to be” an individual consumer, home or
residence. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll (2) (emphasis
added). *223  To broaden the prohibition still further,
Subdivision 2 adds that it shall be unlawful for “any other
person ” to do so. Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, while Subdivision 1 prohibits businesses from sending
cigarettes to an individual, home, or residence, Subdivision 2
prohibits common or contract carriers or “any other person
” (presumably including “person[s] engaged in the business
of selling cigarettes,” which are the subject of Subdivision 1)
from “transporting” or delivering cigarettes to an individual,
home, or residence. Together, Subdivision 1 and Subdivision
2 (as I read them) work together to prohibit completely
the delivery of any cigarettes by any retailer (“person
engaged in the business of selling cigarettes”) through any
instrumentality to any individual, home or residence.
Subdivision 2 provides a limited exception that the State
of New York argues, and I (in agreement with the position
urged by the State) read to be, a personal use exemption.
The provision in Subdivision 2 states that “[n]othing in this
subdivision shall be construed to prohibit a person other than
a common or contract carrier from transporting not more than
eight hundred cigarettes at any one time to any person in this
state.” Id.
Subdivision 2's exemption plainly is limited to “this
subdivision ”-Subdivision 2. By its terms, it plainly does
not affect, abrogate, or alter the terms and provisions of
Subdivision 1. Therefore, Subdivision 2's exemption does not
affect Subdivision 1's proscription against home deliveries by
any “person engaged in the business of selling cigarettes,”
including bricks-and-mortar retailers. It also plainly and by
its terms does not affect Subdivision 2's proscription on
home deliveries by “common or contract carrier[s].” Reading
the Statute as a whole, Subdivisions 1 and 2 create an
integrated scheme barring the home delivery of cigarettes
by any person engaged in the business of selling cigarettes,
including in-state brick-and-mortar retailers, and barring the
home delivery of cigarettes by any carrier, but creating a
limited exemption only for a “person” who is not “engaged
in the business of selling cigarettes,” id. at § 1399-ll (1), and
also is not a “common or contract carrier,” id. at § 1399-ll (2).
So what is the effect of the exemption in Subdivision 2?
The exemption permits home deliveries of four cartons of
cigarettes or fewer by persons that are neither (1) “person[s]
engaged in the business of selling cigarettes” (including
bricks-and-mortar retailers), nor (2) “common or contract
carrier [s].” In other words, it permits home deliveries by
private individuals-a private, natural person could bring home
four cartons or fewer of cigarettes, or could bring that amount
of cigarettes to someone else as a gift, without being subject
to the civil and criminal penalties of the Statute. But under the
exemption in Subdivision 2, a private, natural person could
not even bring four cartons of cigarettes to another's house
for payment or other consideration because then he or she
would qualify as “person engaged in the business of selling
cigarettes,” and fall under the prohibitions of Subdivision 1.
The majority bases its conclusion that the Statute permits
bricks-and-mortar retailers to make direct sales and home
deliveries by straining the distinction between “ship or cause
to be shipped” in Subdivision 1 and “transport” in Subdivision
2. Relying on a definition of “ship” not found in any
dictionary, see text at Note 4, ante, the majority asserts that
“ship” only can mean the sending of something via a third-
party carrier. Therefore, the majority concludes, Subdivision
1 does not prohibit cigarette retailers from sending cigarettes
to a consumer's house in their own *224  trucks; rather,
it only prohibits the retailer from putting the cigarettes on
another person's truck that delivers the cigarettes to the
consumer's house.
Reading the phrase “ship or causing to be shipped” to permit
home deliveries of cigarettes purchased in non-face-to-face
transactions is, in my view, flawed and leads to anomalous,
if not illogical, results.
First, the plain meaning of “ship” includes, but is in no way
limited to, the sending of goods via a third party, as noted
above. Moreover, as discussed below, the majority contends
that the Statute would permit a bricks-and-mortar retailer
located across the country to use its own trucks to deliver
cigarettes to consumers in New York. 5  While one ordinarily
would not speak of cigarettes delivered from across town
by bicycle as having been “shipped,” certainly conveying
cigarettes by truck from one coast to another would constitute
“shipping” them, regardless of the ownership of the trucks.
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5 The majority contends that the Statute does not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause because it (under the
majority's view) permits traditional retailers located
anywhere in the country to ship up to four cartons of
cigarettes to the homes of consumers in New York,
and therefore the Statute does not favor local traditional
retailers with delivery services. Majority Op. at II.B.1
of its Discussion Section. I do not reach the question
of whether the Statute would violate the dormant
Commerce Clause were it to permit home deliveries
by traditional retailers located anywhere in the country
because I read the Statute to prohibit home deliveries
by “any person engaged in the business of selling
cigarettes,” including all traditional retailers located
anywhere in the United States.
Second, the majority's emphasis on “ship” ignores the fact
that the entire statutory phrase is “ship or cause to be
shipped.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-ll (1) (emphasis
added). Were “ship” exclusively to mean sending goods via
a third party, the phrase “or causing to be shipped” would
be surplusage. That the entire phrase is “ship or cause to be
shipped” serves to make clear that cigarette sellers are barred
both (i) from sending or delivering cigarettes to a residence,
and also (ii) from causing any third party to do so.
Third, reading the Statute to permit “bricks-and-mortar
retailers” to conclude non-face-to-face sales and deliver
cigarettes so purchased directly to the consumer's home
leads to an illogical result. Relying on the word “ship,”
but on no other in the Statute, the majority holds (contrary
to the interpretation of the Statute urged by any of the
parties or by the District Court) that the delivery exemption
permits direct retailers of cigarettes-whether in-state or out-
of-state-to sell cigarettes via telephone and the internet so
long as they use their own trucking services to deliver
the cigarettes to consumers' homes (thereby avoiding the
prohibition on “ship [ping]” them). See Majority Op. at
II.B.2 of the Discussion Section. 6  Thus, according to the
majority, the only effect of the Statute's prohibition against
“ship[ing]” cigarettes is to require cigarette retailers to use
their own trucks instead of third-party carriers for home
deliveries. The majority's interpretation that the Statute does
not prohibit direct shipments causes the Statute to be without
any purpose whatsoever-an absurd result surely not intended
by the legislature. Cf. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453, 476, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) *225
(stating the rule that “it [is] unreasonable to believe that
the legislator intended to include the particular [proposed
interpretation]” if such interpretation leads to an “absurd
result” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf.
also People v. Bolden, 81 N.Y.2d 146, 152, 597 N.Y.S.2d
270, 613 N.E.2d 145 (1993) (stating that “courts should not
interpret [a statute] in such a way that produces ‘absurd’
results” (citations omitted)).
6 The majority here states that a “direct shipper who ...
currently receives cigarette orders on his website and
then ships cigarettes directly to the buyer's residence,
would also be required under the [delivery exemption] to
maintain his own fleet of delivery trucks, employ drivers,
and undertake any other necessary investment.” Id.
The absurdity is compounded when the majority later states,
directly contradicting its earlier interpretation of the delivery
exemption, that the Statute makes “direct shippers ... subject
to the Statute's civil and criminal penalties regardless of
what means of transport they use to deliver the cigarettes.”
Majority Op. at III.A.3 of the Discussion Section (emphasis
in original). 7  So holding, the majority gives the Statute some
purpose. But in so doing, it adopts a distinction not contained
in the Statute-between direct sellers, on the one hand, and
traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers who sell and deliver
cigarettes without a face-to-face transaction, on the other.
This is a distinction without a difference, and one invented
out of whole cloth because the Statute itself addresses only
“person[s] engaged in the business of selling cigarettes,” not
so-called direct and so-called traditional retailers.
7 Thus the majority interprets the Statute (i) to permit all
cigarette retailers to make home deliveries of four cartons
or fewer as long as they use their own delivery services,
Majority Op. at II.B.2 of the Discussion Section, and
(ii) to permit only traditional retailers, but not direct
retailers, to make home deliveries using their own
delivery services, id. at III.A.3 of the Discussion Section.
These positions are contradictory-it cannot be true both
that the Statute permits only traditional retailers to make
home deliveries and that it permits all retailers to make
home deliveries.
Justifying its extra-textual differentiation of direct and
traditional cigarette sellers, and the conclusion that the Statute
permits traditional retailers to make non-face-to-face sales
and make home deliveries (thereby functioning exactly like
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“direct” sellers), the majority points to a letter from a lobbyist
to the New York governor's counsel. Majority Op. at II.B.2 of
the Discussion Section (citing letter dated July 18, 2000, from
Michael Rosen, Vice President and General Counsel of the
Food Industry Alliance, to James M. McGuire, Counsel to the
Governor). This letter sets forth the lobbyist's understanding
that the Statute would permit New York State grocers to
continue to make home deliveries of cigarettes.
I credit, arguendo, that this letter represents the lobbyist's
understanding of the Statute. However, a lobbyist's gloss
on a statute is not relevant to a court's interpretation of the
statute. Where resort must be had to legislative history at all,
the relevant materials are those produced by the appropriate
legislative committees. See, e.g. Garcia v. United States, 469
U.S. 70, 76, 105 S.Ct. 479, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) (stating
that courts should look only to Committee Reports that “
‘represent[ ] the considered and collective understanding
of those [legislators] involved in drafting and studying the
proposed legislation)’ ” (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S.
168, 186, 90 S.Ct. 314, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969)). Even the
statements of individual legislators are of dubious authority.
Id. In the interpretive schema courts ordinarily apply to
statutes, an unsolicited letter by a lobbyist to a member of an
executive's staff (not even a legislator) would have no place
and no probative value. The foregoing is consistent with the
methods of statutory construction followed by the New York
State courts. 8
8 The New York Court of Appeals has held that, in
questions of statutory interpretation, a court's “analysis
begins with the language of the statute. If the terms are
clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so
as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used.”
Auerbach v. Board of Educ., 86 N.Y.2d 198, 204, 630
N.Y.S.2d 698, 654 N.E.2d 972 (1995) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The lobbyist's letter at issue
here clearly is not part of the “language of the statute.”
Id. Where resort must be had to legislative history, the
“objective ... is to discern and apply the will of the
Legislature, not the court's own perception.” Matter of
Sutka v. Conners, 73 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 541 N.Y.S.2d
191, 538 N.E.2d 1012 (1989) (emphasis added); see also
N.Y. Stat. Ann. § 92(b) (stating that courts are bound to
give effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed,
first, in the text of the statute and, second, in the
“such facts ... as may ... legitimately reveal [legislators'
intent]”).
*226  In conclusion, based on the plain language of the
Statute as set forth above, and the express purpose of the
Statute to require all cigarette purchases in New York State
to take place exclusively through face-to-face transactions, I
respectfully disagree with the District Court and the majority
that the Statute can be read to permit retailers using their
own delivery services to deliver cigarettes to homes. I instead
adopt the State of New York's argument on the plain language
of the Statute that it does not.
2. The majority's reading of the Statute would cause the
Statute to discriminate impermissibly in favor of local
interests
After determining that the Statute permits home deliveries by
bricks-and-mortar retailers, the District Court held that the
Statute discriminates in effect against interstate commerce
because only in-state bricks-and-mortar retailers feasibly
could make a large number of home deliveries. The District
Court reasoned that the total effect of the Statute was
simultaneously to prohibit all out-of-state retailers from
shipping cigarettes to New York homes, while permitting
certain types of in-state retailers to ship cigarettes to New
York homes. Based on this view of the Statute, the District
Court reasonably concluded that the Statute effectively closes
the state to out-of-state cigarette retailers while permitting in-
state retailers to continue to sell cigarettes to consumers in
non-face-to-face transactions and deliver them to consumers'
homes, in violation of its own stated purpose of eliminating
all non-face-to-face transactions. So concluding, the District
Court held that the Statute (i) fails the Pike balancing test by
imposing a burden on interstate commerce that is not justified
by the Statute's putative benefits, and (ii) impermissibly
serves as a protectionist measure to privilege New York
traditional retailers over direct retailers and over out-of-state
traditional retailers.
The majority follows the District Court in finding that the
delivery exemption of Subdivision 2(i) creates a differential
impact on in-state and out-of-state retailers, effectively
restricting cigarettes sale to in-state retailers only, while
(ii) failing to eliminate non-face-to-face transactions by
permitting in-state, traditional retailers to continue such
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transactions. Yet, the majority concludes that the Statute
passes the Pike balancing test.
I believe that, were the delivery exemption to permit bricks-
and-mortar retailers to sell cigarettes directly and make home
deliveries as the majority argues, the Statute would fail the
Pike test. The Statute would fail the Pike test if it permitted
direct sales and home deliveries by traditional retailers (in
effect, in-state retailers) because it would burden interstate
commerce while rendering the professed purpose of the
Statute illusory, leading to the conclusion that it accomplishes
nothing but the protectionist purpose of requiring consumers
to purchase cigarettes from in-state traditional retailers.
*227  The teaching of the Supreme Court in Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66
L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), supports my view that the Statute would
fail the Pike test if its effect were to permit direct sales
and home deliveries only by in-state, traditional retailers. In
Clover Leaf, the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute
requiring milk to be packaged in biodegradable containers,
the effect of which was to favor pulp producers located
predominantly in Minnesota and to disadvantage plastics
producers located predominantly outside of Minnesota. The
Court stated that “[o]nly if the burden on interstate commerce
clearly outweighs the State's legitimate purposes does such
a regulation violate the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 474,
101 S.Ct. 715. Therefore, under Clover Leaf, a statute at
the very least must have a “legitimate purpose” before it
constitutionally may burden interstate commerce. Here, if,
as the majority contends, the Statute were to permit non-
face-to-face sales and home deliveries by in-state traditional
retailers, the Statute would not have a “legitimate purpose”
because it would fail by its own terms in prohibiting such
transactions. Therefore, I believe that the majority's reading of
the Statute would cause it to discriminate unconstitutionally
against interstate commerce because it would favor local
interests for no legitimate purpose.
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